# History Grade 12 Paper 1 North West Mock 2025 Addendum

> Grade 12 History Paper 1 addendum from the North West Mock Exam 2025, 14 pages. Read online or get the free PDF download.

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- Updated: 2026-09-27
- Subject: History
- Grade: Grade 12
- Document type: Addendum
- Year: 2025
- Exam period: North West Mock Exam
- Paper: 1
- Curriculum: CAPS
- Pages: 14

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History · Grade 12 · North West Mock Exam · 2025. Addendum, 14 pages. Read online or download the PDF.

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### Page 1

education

Department:

Education

North West Provincial Government
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

HISTORY P1
SEPTEMBER 2025
ADDENDUM

This addendum consists of 14 pages.

Copyright reserved Please turn over

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NW/September 2025

QUESTION 1: WHY DID THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA GIVE FINANCIAL
AID TO THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AFTER 1945?

SOURCE 1A

The source below explains the United States of America's intention to contain the spread
of communism in Europe from 1947 onwards.

.. United States officials in 1947 and 1948 did not have precise ideas about how to
implement containment. Should containment be applied everywhere? Should it be
applied militarily? Should the United States focus on economic aid to nations seeking to
reconstruct their economies? Should the United States assign priority to occupation
policies, especially in Germany and Japan?

Initially, in what became known as the Truman Doctrine, the United States president
proposed military aid to Greece and Turkey, and declared that the United States would
contest totalitarian expansion everywhere. But his subordinates quickly recognised that
they had to calculate priorities carefully. They decided that they should focus on
economic reconstruction in Western Europe rather than military rearmament; that they
should seek to erode (wear down) support for communist parties in France, Italy, and
Greece; that they should manage the revitalisation (recovery) of Western Germany and
Japan, and co-opt (choose) their future power. Containment meant that Soviet influence
and communist ideology should be contained within the areas occupied by the forces of
the Soviet Union at the end of World War II.

In June 1947, the United States announced the Marshall Plan to help rebuild Europe.
The governments of most Western European nations were happy to receive US money
and participate in a reconstruction programme. But they possessed deep fears about the
revival of German power. In order to get the French to cooperate, the United States
promised to retain its occupation forces inside Germany.

From http://press_princeton.edu/chapters/pons/s2-9143.pdf. Accessed on 04 November 2024.

Copyright reserved Please turn over

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NW/September 2025

SOURCE 1B

This source highlights the role that Dean Acheson, Deputy Secretary of State during George
Marshall's administration, played in influencing the United States Congress to adopt Truman's
policies in 1947.

... Acheson also played a vital role in shaping the political and economic institutions of
Truman's Cold War. In early 1947, with Byrnes out and George Marshall in as the secretary
of state, the anti-communist governments of Turkey and Greece claimed to be under severe
Soviet pressure and could not guarantee their own survival. Convinced that the United
States must help the Turkish and Greek governments, the administration nevertheless
faced the difficult task of persuading a fiscally (financially) careful Congress to provide the
aid needed to shore up (support) these governments.

On 27 February Truman called a meeting between administration officials and a handful of
leading senators and members of congress in the hope of winning over the legislators.
Acheson described this encounter as 'Armageddon' (a term used to describe the end of the
world). Marshall spoke first, emphasising the need for the United States to act because it
was the right thing to do and because no one else would help. The legislators seemed
unmoved. Was it America's fight? Was the bill (cost) likely to be enormous? Acheson asked
to speak.

Immediately he changed the terms of the debate. The crisis in South-eastern Europe, he
said, was no local dust-up (smail fight) but one that involved the two Cold War powers. The
Soviets were pressuring Turkey and Greece as they had pressured Iran. At stake was a
vast portion of the free world, for if Greece went communist, ‘like apples in a barrel infected
by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east. It would
also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and Europe through Italy and
France’, which faced communist threats of their own. Only the United States stood in the
way of a communist onslaught that would, if successful, snuff out freedom and destroy all
hope of economic recovery in parts of three continents. The congressional leaders were
impressed and the pronouncement of the Truman Doctrine followed on 12 March, promising
that the United States would fight communism everywhere.

[From http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/A-D/Cold-Warriors-Dean-acheson.html.
Accessed on 04 November 2024.]

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NW/September 2025

SOURCE 1C

This source was written by an academic, Scott D Parrish, from the University of Texas in
the United States of America. He analysed Evgenii Varga's (Soviet academic and
economist) rejection of the Marshall Plan.

Varga put forward an economic explanation, arguing that 'the economic situation in the
United States was the decisive (key) factor in putting forward the Marshall Plan proposal.
The Marshall Plan is intended in the first instance to serve as a means of softening the
expected economic crisis, the approach of which already no one in the United States
denies'. Varga then went on to outline the dimensions (lengths) of the economic crisis,
which he expected would soon overtake the United States. He anticipated a twenty per cent
drop in production during this crisis, leading to the creation of a ten-million-man army of
unemployed, and wreaking havoc (causing disaster) on the American banking system. As
to the political effects of these economic difficulties, he concluded that 'the explosion of the
economic and financial crisis will result in a significant drop in the foreign policy prestige
(status) of the United States, which hopes to play the role of stabiliser of international
capitalism’.

The Marshall Plan, wrote Varga, represented an attempt to forestall (prevent) this crisis. In
his view, the United States found itself compelled (forced) to increase exports in order to
avoid the onset of a serious economic depression. To accomplish such an increase in
exports, the United States would grant credit to the European countries, even if they could
not repay them. Varga observed that this expedient (action) would prove especially
beneficial to ‘monopoly capital’. He concluded:

‘Seen against this background, the idea behind the Marshall Plan is the following: If it is in
the interest of the United States itself to sell abroad American goods worth several billion
dollars on credit to bankrupt borrowers, then it is necessary to attempt to gain from these
credits the maximum political benefits.’

[From https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACFB73.pdf.
Accessed on 04 November 2024.]

Copyright reserved Please turn over

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NW/September 2025

SOURCE 1D

This cartoon was published in the Krokodil, a Soviet magazine, in 1948. It depicts the effects
of the Marshall Plan.

The United
States of
America,

whose
face is
depicted
as a one-
dollar coin
(US
currency)

Various
European
countries

that
received
Marshall

Aid

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NW/September 2025

QUESTION 2: HOW DID FOREIGN POWERS BECOME INVOLVED IN THE COLD
WAR IN ANGOLA FROM 1975?

SOURCE 2A

This source explains how the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA fought over control of Angola after
it attained independence in 1975.

Three main military movements had been fighting for Angolan independence since the
1960s. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was a Marxist
organisation centred in the capital, Luanda, and led by Agostinho Neto. The National Front
for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), led by Holden Roberto, was based in the north of the
country and had strong ties to the US ally (friend), Mobutu Sese Seko, in neighbouring
Zaire. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), an offshoot of the
FNLA, was led by Jonas Savimbi and supported by the country's largest ethnic group, the
Ovimbundu.

Following the Portuguese coup (revolution), these three revolutionaries met with
representatives of the new Portuguese government in January 1975 and signed the Alvor
Agreement that granted Angolan independence and provided for a three-way power
sharing government. However, trust quickly broke down among the three groups, and the
country descended (fell) into civil war as each vied (competed) for sole (total) power.

The crisis in Angola developed into a Cold War battleground as the superpowers and their
allies delivered military assistance to their preferred clients. The United States supplied aid
and training for both the FNLA and UNITA while troops from Zaire assisted Holden Roberto
and his fighters. China also seni military instructors to train the FNLA. The Soviet Union
provided military training and equipment to the MPLA. During the summer of 1975, the
Soviet-supported MPLA was able to consolidate power in Luanda and oust (get rid of) the
US-supported FNLA from the capital, but the FNLA continued to attack.

[From http://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/angola. Accessed on 4 November 2024.]

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NW/September 2025

SOURCE 2B

This source focuses on a speech that was delivered by the South African Prime Minister,
BJ Vorster, in the House of Assembly in 1976. Vorster outlined the reasons for South
Africa's intervention in the Cold War in Angola.

In the House of Assembly in January 1976 Vorster (South Africa's Prime Minister) placed
the. blame for South Africa's intervention in Angola squarely on the shoulders of the
Russians and Cubans: ‘Our involvement was the effect of Russian and Cuban intervention.
If they did not enter Angola, if they did not take part in this affair, if they did not try to subvert
(undermine) the whole of Angola and to suppress (contain) its people, South Africa would
never have entered Angola at all ... We went in to chase Cuba and the MPLA away from
the dams (Ruacana and Calueque).'

It can hardly be doubted that the support which the Russians and the Cubans gave to the
MPLA in the form of arms and training contributed in some measure to motivating South
Africa's intervention, but it is unlikely that it was as crucial a reason as Vorster implied. It
was Swapo, not the Cubans and the MPLA, who threatened the two dams between
Ruacana and Calueque. The main reason for South Africa's intervention in Angola was not
the presence of Russians and Cubans, but the desire (longing) to prevent a hostile MPLA
government from taking control. When South African troops began to invade Angola early
in October, there were hardly any Russians and very few Cubans in the country.

There is also evidence that President Kaunda of Zambia and President Mobutu of Zaire,
neither of whom favoured the MPLA, welcomed South Africa's support for the FNLA and
UNITA.

... South Africa's actions drew her progressively (more and more) deeper into the Angolan
war ... General Hendrik van den Bergh was sent to France to purchase weapons to the
value of R20 million for the FNLA and UNITA ... South African instructors began to train
FNLA and UNITA soldiers in southern Angola.

[From South Africa in the 20” Century by BJ Liebenberg and SB Spies (editors)]

Copyright reserved Please turn over

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NW/September 2025

SOURCE 2C

Below is an extract from a speech delivered by the Cuban Prime Minister, Fidel Castro, in
Havana on 19 April 1976. He outlines the reasons for Cuba's assistance to the MPLA.

On 5 November 1975, at the request of the MPLA, the leadership of our party decided to
send with great urgency a battalion [division] of regular troops and anti-tank weapons to
help the Angolan patriots resist the invasion of the South African racists. This was the first
Cuban troop unit sent to Angola ...

Cuba alone bears the responsibility of taking that decision. The USSR had always helped
the people of the Portuguese colonies in their struggle for independence, provided besieged
[surrounded] Angola with basic military equipment and collaborated [cooperated] with us
when imperialism had cut off practically all our air routes to Africa. But it never requested
that a single Cuban be sent to that country. The USSR is extraordinarily respectful and
careful in its relations with Cuba. A decision of that nature could only be made by our own

party.

Ford and Kissinger lie to the people of the United States and to world public opinion when
they try to place the responsibility for Cuba's action in solidarity with Angola on the Soviet
Union.

[From Fidel Castro Speeches: Cuba's international Foreign Policy 1975-1980 by F Castro]

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NW/September 2025

SOURCE 2D

The following cartoon by Thomas Wright, an American artist, appeared in the Miami News.
It was reprinted in the Washington Post on 7 December 1975. The cartoon depicts the
involvement of the USSR and Cuba in Angola during the first phase of the Angolan Cold
War, which was fought from 1975 to 1976.

Fidel Castro:
Angolan Prime Minister of
Jungle/bush Cuba

[From Conflicting Missions — Havana, Washington, Pretoria by P Gleijeses]

Copyright reserved Please turn over

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NW/September 2025

QUESTION 3: HOW DID THE BIRMINGHAM CAMPAIGNS CONTRIBUTE TO THE
GRANTING OF CIVIL RIGHTS TO AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN THE 1960’s?

SOURCE 3A
The source below has been extracted from an interview with reverend Joseph Ellwanger,

a white Lutheran minister, who was part of the committee that organised the 1963
Birmingham Campaign.

Birmingham in 1963 was about as segregated a city in the South as you can find. There
were still signs over the water fountains. There were no black clerks in the downtown stores.
There were no blacks in the police or fire department. And there were a lot of open threats
on the part of the police commissioner, Bull Connor, against any attempt to gain some of
these rights ...

There was not only the belief in the white community that blacks were inferior, but that belief
was Clearly articulated and was assumed as the basis for the segregation that had existed
all these years ... many members of the Ku Klux Klan had ... almost a religious belief in
their hearts, that we've got to maintain that kind of purity of the race or otherwise we're
dooming ourselves and our future generation.

As we think about what white people were afraid of in terms of the possibility of an integrated
society, part of it was simply the fear of the unknown. Perhaps even deeper was the fear of
the Ku Klux Klan and their threats becoming a reality. In Birmingham, we had something
like forty bombings in the previous ten years, so it was not an idle threat ...

My role in the Birmingham demonstrations was basically being part of a committee of twenty
that met to do the planning ... | can still remember those sessions with Dr King and Ralph
Abernathy and Andrew Young, and it was an amazing experience of an openness towards
everybody's ideas. There was no one who was not given the opportunity to help participate
in the planning.

[From Voices of Freedom. An Oral History of the Civil Rights Movement by Henry Hampton
and Steve Fayer]

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NW/September 2025

SOURCE 3B

The source below focuses on the strategies adopted by protestors, the reaction by state
authorities and the impact of media coverage of the Birmingham campaign in 1963.

The Birmingham campaign began quietly with sit-ins on 3 April 1963 at several downtown
‘whites-only’ lunch counters. From the outset, the campaign confronted an apathetic
(uninterested) black community, an openly hostile established black leadership and Bull
Connor's ‘non-violent resistance' in the form of police arrests of the offenders of the city's
segregation ordinances. With no sensational news, the national media found nothing to
report, and the campaign floundered (declined). But when Connor ordered out police dogs
to disperse a crowd of black bystanders, journalists recorded the attack of a German
shepherd on a nonviolent protester, thereby revealing the brutality that undermined
segregation ...

In a desperate bid to generate media coverage and to keep the campaign alive ... the
Children's Campaign was launched on 2 May 1963, in which black youth from area
schools (state schools) served as demonstrators. Trying to avoid the use of force, Bull
Connor arrested hundreds of school children and hauled them off to jail on school buses.
When the jails were filled, he called out fire hoses and police dogs to contain large protests
... African American spectators responded with outrage, pelting police with bricks and
bottles as firemen opened up the hoses.

The media captured the negative images of Connor and his men suppressing the non-
violent protest of school children with brutal blasts of water cannons and attacks from
police dogs. Front page photographs in the nation's newspapers convinced President
Kennedy to send the assistant attorney-general for Civil Rights, Burke Marshall, to
Birmingham to secure negotiations that would end the violent demonstrations.

[From http://www.encyclopediaofalabama.org/face/Article.jsp?id=h-1358.
Accessed on 04 November 2024.]

Copyright reserved Please turn over

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NW/September 2025

SOURCE 3C

This photograph appeared in the Daily News during the Birmingham Campaign, 1963. It
shows firemen who had been ordered to use their high-pressure hoses on civil rights
protestors who are seated on the pavement.

Copyright reserved Please turn over

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NW/September 2025

SOURCE 3D

This is an extract from a televised speech given to the American public by President JF
Kennedy on 11 June 1963 in reaction to events in Birmingham and other protests
elsewhere.

The heart of the question is whether all Americans are to be afforded equal rights and equal
opportunities, whether we are going to treat our fellow Americans as we want to be treated.
If an American, because his skin is dark, cannot eat lunch in a restaurant open to the public,
if he cannot send his children to the best public school available, if he cannot vote for the
public officials who represent him, if, in short, he cannot enjoy the full and free life which all
of us want, then who among us would be content to have the colour of his skin changed
and stand in his place? ...

Now the time has come for this nation to fulfil its promise. The events in Birmingham and
elsewhere have so increased the cries for equality that no city or state or legislative body
can prudently (wisely) choose to ignore them.

The fires of frustration and discord are burning in every city, north and south, where legal
remedies are not at hand. Redress is sought in the streets, in demonstrations, parades,
and protests which create tensions and threaten violence and threaten lives.

We face, therefore, a moral crisis as a country and as a people. It cannot be met by
repressive police action. It cannot be left to increased demonstrations in the streets. It
cannot be quieted by token moves or talk. It is a time to act in the Congress, in your state
and local legislative body and, above ail, in ail of our daily lives ...

Next week | shall ask the Congress of the United States to act, to make a commitment it
has not fully made in this century to the proposition that race has no place in American life
or law ...

[From http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/kennedy/civilrightsmessage.htmI.
Accessed on 04 November 2024.]

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NW/September 2025

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following:

Castro, F. Fide! Castro Speeches: Cuba's International Foreign Policy 1975-1980
Hampton, H and Fayer, S. Voices of Freedom. An Oral History of the Civil Rights Movement

Gleijeses, P. Conflicting Missions — Havana, Washington, Pretoria

http://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/angola.

http://www.dailynews.com.

http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/pons/s2-9143.pdf

http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/A-D/Cold-Warriors-Dean-acheson.html.

http://www.encyclopediaofalabama.org/face/Article.jsp?id=h-1358

http://www. presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/kennedy/civilrightsmessage.html.

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACFB73.pdf.

Liebenberg, BJ and Spies, SB. (editors). South Africa in the 20" Century

Waugh, S. Essential Modern History

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