# History Grade 12 P1 NSC November 2017 Addendum (English)

> Grade 12 History Paper 1 addendum from the NSC November Exam 2017 (English), 14 pages. Read online or get the free PDF download.

- Page: https://www.hlayiso.com/library/history-p1-nov-2017-addendum-eng/07c25d32-1f66-493e-8943-f8386e44f1e9
- Updated: 2026-09-27
- Subject: History
- Grade: Grade 12
- Document type: Addendum
- Year: 2017
- Exam period: NSC November Exam
- Paper: 1
- Curriculum: CAPS
- Pages: 14

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History · Grade 12 · NSC November Exam · 2017. Addendum, 14 pages. Read online or download the PDF.

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                                   NATIONAL
                              SENIOR CERTIFICATE

                                    GRADE 12

                                   HISTORY P1

                                NOVEMBER 2017

                                   ADDENDUM

                        This addendum consists of 14 pages.

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QUESTION 1:          HOW DID THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET MISSILES IN CUBA
                     INTENSIFY COLD WAR TENSIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
                     OF AMERICA AND THE SOVIET UNION?

SOURCE 1A

The source below outlines Fidel Castro's negotiations with Nikita Khrushchev about the
deployment of missiles in Cuba.

By 1962 Castro's Cuba was well established as an enemy of the United States.
Two years earlier the Eisenhower administration had hired members of the Mafia to
assassinate Castro and had begun training anti-Castro Cuban exiles for an invasion of
their homeland. The Kennedy administration inherited the project that led to the Bay of
Pigs. After this misbegotten [bad] affair, the Kennedy administration sponsored a CIA
campaign of harassment and sabotage [of Castro and his supporters].

Castro, again not unreasonably, turned to the Soviet Union as Cuba's protector.
He hoped, through a proclamation or an alliance or Soviet conventional military aid, to
deter [discourage] American aggression. He did not request, nor did he want, nuclear
missiles. This was Khrushchev's idea. 'When Castro and I talked about the problem,'
Khrushchev recalled in his memoirs, 'we argued and argued. Our argument was very
heated. But, in the end, Fidel agreed with me.'

Castro reluctantly accepted nuclear missiles, as he later said, 'not in order to ensure our
own defence, but primarily to strengthen socialism on the international plane [level]'.
He then asked Khrushchev to go public when he delivered the missiles. 'Why do it
secretly as if we had no right to do it?'

After all, the Soviet Union had every right under international law to send the missiles and
Cuba had every right to receive them. 'I warned Nikita that secrecy would hand the
imperialists the advantage.'

Fortunately for the imperialists Khrushchev did not follow Castro's advice. Had he done
so, it would have been far harder to force the missiles out. Khrushchev's secrecy played
into Kennedy's hands.

                            [From Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis by RF Kennedy]

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SOURCE 1B

This aerial photograph was taken by Major Heyser from an American U-2 spy plane on
14 October 1962. The labelling in the photograph below was added by the American
intelligence service (CIA).

                     MISSILE ERECTOR             CABLE

        MISSILE SHELTER TENT
                                                     TRACKED PRIME MOVERS

                                                                             OXIDIZER TANK TRAILERS

  FUEL TANK TRAILERS

         [From http://cdn.history.com/sites/2/2015/07/hith-cuban-misile-crii.jpg. Accessed on 6 March 2017.]

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SOURCE 1C

The source below is a transcript of a televised speech that President Kennedy delivered
to the American nation on 22 October 1962. It outlines the steps that Kennedy intended to
take against the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

Acting in the defence of our own security and of the entire Western Hemisphere, I have
directed that the following initial steps be taken immediately:

First: To halt this offensive [invasive] build-up, a strict quarantine [blockade] on all
offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any
kind bound for Cuba, from whatever nation or port will, if found to contain cargoes of
offensive weapons, be turned back …

Second: I have directed the continued and increased close surveillance of Cuba and its
military build-up … I have directed the Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities
[possibilities] …

Third: It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from
Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on
the United States, requiring a full retaliatory [avenging] response upon the Soviet Union ...

Sixth: … Our resolution will call for the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive
weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of United Nations observers, before the
quarantine can be lifted.

Seventh and finally: I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this
clandestine [secret], reckless and provocative [confrontational] threat to world peace and
to stabilise relations between our two nations. I call upon him further to abandon this
course of world domination … and withdrawing these weapons from Cuba by refraining
from any action which will widen or deepen the present crisis and then participating in a
search for peaceful and permanent solutions.

                           [From Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis by RF Kennedy]

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SOURCE 1D

The source below is part of a letter that Nikita Khrushchev (Soviet President) wrote to
John F Kennedy (US President) on 26 October 1962. Khrushchev stated that he was
prepared to withdraw missiles from Cuba on condition that the United States of America
stopped the blockade of Soviet missiles to Cuba.

… You have been worried over our assisting Cuba with arms designed to strengthen its
defensive potential because Cuba, no matter what weapons it had, could not compare
with you …

Our intention has been and is to help Cuba, and no one can challenge the humanity of
our motives aimed at allowing Cuba to live peacefully and develop as its people desire.
You want to relieve your country from danger and this is understandable.

You are worried over Cuba. You say that it worries you because it lies at a distance of
ninety miles across the sea from the shores of the Unites States. However, Turkey lies
next to us. Our sentinels [guards] are pacing up and down and are watching each other.
Do you believe that you have the right to demand security for your country and the
removal of such weapons that you qualify as offensive, while not recognising this right for
us? You have stationed devastating rocket weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey
literally next to us …

This is why I make this proposal: We agree to move those weapons from Cuba which you
regard as offensive weapons. We agree to do this and to state this commitment in the
United Nations … The United States, on its part, bearing in mind the anxiety and concern
of the Soviet state, will evacuate its analogous [similar] weapons from Turkey.

… the Soviet government gives a solemn pledge to respect the integrity of the frontiers
and the sovereignty of Turkey, not to intervene in its domestic affairs, not to invade
Turkey, nor to make available its territory as a place d'armes [military base] for such
invasion, and also will restrain those who would think of launching an aggression against
Turkey from Soviet territory …

                                           [From Chambers Book Of Great Speeches by A Burnet]

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QUESTION 2:          WHY DID CUBA BECOME INVOLVED IN THE ANGOLAN CIVIL
                     WAR IN 1975?

SOURCE 2A

The source below highlights how various Angolan liberation movements were assisted by
foreign powers after the collapse of the Alvor Agreement.

… Attempts by the Portuguese government to assist with Angola's independence were
made through the Alvor Agreement in January 1975. … a coalition government by leading
political role-players was given the responsibility of governing Angola from 31 January
1975 until independence on 11 November 1975.

Both the Alvor Agreement and the coalition government had been strongly endorsed
[supported], particularly by other African states through the OAU (Organisation of African
Unity) but without results. Heavy fighting broke out among the three former liberation
movements (MPLA, FNLA and UNITA) in July 1975, and the coalition government
collapsed …

As the conflict escalated, each movement turned to its old allies from the struggle for
independence for military hardware and personnel. During the transitional period, foreign
powers became increasingly involved in the situation in Angola, rapidly expanding into an
East-West power struggle and an extension of the Cold War …

The question of 'who came first' has been the subject of much debate. It is clear that
Cuba had been involved in Angola through its support for the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) since the early 1960s, and that the Soviet Union had also
supported the MPLA.
                                 [From Angola, Struggle for Peace and Reconstruction by I Tvedten]

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SOURCE 2B

The source below is an extract from a letter dated 26 January 1975. It was written by the
leader of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), Agostinho Neto,
while visiting Dar es Salaam. It was sent to the Cuban government requesting military
assistance.

Dar es Salaam, 26 January 1975

Dear Comrades

Given the situation on the ground of our movement and our country, and taking into
account the results of the exploratory [experimental] trip of the official Cuban delegation,
we are sending you a list of the urgent needs of our organisation. We are confident that
you will give it immediate consideration.

1.   The establishment, organisation and maintenance of a military school for cadres.
     We urgently need to create a company of security personnel, and we need to
     prepare the members of our military staff.

2.   We need to rent a ship to transport the war material that we have in Dar es Salaam
     to Angola. The delivery in Angola, if this were a Cuban ship, could take place outside
     of the territorial waters.

3.   Weapons and means of transportation

We also urge the Communist Party of Cuba to use its influence with other countries that
are its friends and allies, especially from the Socialist camp, so that they can grant useful
and timely aid to our movement, which is the only guarantee of a democratic and
progressive Angola in the future.

Comrades, accept our revolutionary greetings and convey the good wishes of the
combatants of the MPLA and of the new Angola to Prime Minister Fidel Castro.

                       [From http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/17/documents/angola/.
                                                                   Accessed on 30 October 2016.]

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SOURCE 2C

Below is an extract from a speech delivered by the Cuban Prime Minister, Fidel Castro, in
Havana on 19 April 1976. He outlines the reasons for Cuba's assistance to the MPLA.

On 5 November 1975, at the request of the MPLA, the leadership of our party decided to
send with great urgency a battalion [division] of regular troops and anti-tank weapons to
help the Angolan patriots resist the invasion of the South African racists. This was the first
Cuban troop unit sent to Angola …

Cuba alone bears the responsibility of taking that decision. The USSR had always helped
the people of the Portuguese colonies in their struggle for independence, provided
besieged [surrounded] Angola with basic military equipment and collaborated
[cooperated] with us when imperialism had cut off practically all our air routes to Africa.
But it never requested that a single Cuban be sent to that country. The USSR is
extraordinarily respectful and careful in its relations with Cuba. A decision of that nature
could only be made by our own party.

Ford and Kissinger lie to the people of the United States and to world public opinion when
they try to place the responsibility for Cuba's action in solidarity with Angola on the Soviet
Union.
                [From Fidel Castro Speeches: Cuba's International Foreign Policy 1975–1980 by F Castro]

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SOURCE 2D

The American cartoon below depicts the involvement of the Soviet Union and Cuba in
Angola after 1975.

                     ONE BAD TURN AFTER ANOTHER

                                  [From http://cartoonmuseum.eu/en/cartoons/ussr-cuba-angola/.
                                                              Accessed on 8 November 2016.]

         Leonid                    Fidel                                   ANGOLA
         Brezhnev,                 Castro,
         leader of                 leader
         the Soviet                of Cuba
         Union

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QUESTION 3:          HOW DID THE BLACK POWER MOVEMENT MOBILISE AFRICAN
                     AMERICANS DURING THE 1960s?

SOURCE 3A

The extract below outlines Stokely Carmichael's explanation regarding the philosophy of
Black Power.

The concept of Black Power … is a call for black people in this country to unite, to
recognise their heritage, to build a sense of community. It is a call for black people to
begin to define their own goals, to lead their own organisations and to support those
organisations …

Black Power therefore calls for black people to consolidate [unite] behind their own, so
that they can bargain from a position of strength ... The ultimate values and goals are not
domination or exploitation of other groups, but rather an effective share in the total power
of the society …

One of the tragedies of the struggle against racism is that up to this point, there has been
no national organisation that could speak to the growing militancy of young black people
in the urban ghettos and the Black Belt South (areas in the south of America which were
predominantly occupied by African Americans). There has been only a 'civil rights'
movement, whose tone of voice was adapted to an audience of middle-class whites.
It served as a sort of buffer [barrier] zone between that audience and angry young blacks.
It claimed to speak for the needs of a community, but it did not speak in the tone of that
community. None of its so-called leaders could go into a rioting community and be
listened to.

'Integration' as a goal today speaks to the problem of blackness, not only in an unrealistic
way, but also in a despicable [shameful] way. It is based on complete acceptance of the
fact that in order to have a decent house or education, black people must move into a
white neighbourhood or send their children to a white school. This reinforces, among both
black and white, the idea that 'white' is automatically superior and 'black' is by definition
inferior. For this reason, 'integration' is a subterfuge [strategy] for the maintenance of
white supremacy.

                            [From Black Power – The Politics of Liberation by K Ture and CV Hamilton]

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SOURCE 3B

Below is an extract from Malcolm X's speech 'The Ballot or the Bullet', which he delivered
in Detroit on 12 April 1964. It outlines the need for African Americans to take up arms to
fight for their freedom.

… We're all in the same bag, in the same boat. We suffer political oppression, economic
exploitation and social degradation [humiliation], all of them from the same enemy.

The government has failed us, you can't deny that. Anytime you live in the twentieth
century, 1964 and you're walking around here singing 'We Shall Overcome', the
government has failed us. This is part of what's wrong with you, you do too much singing.
Today it's time to stop singing and start swinging [fighting]. You can't sing up on freedom,
but you can swing up on some freedom. Cassius Clay [Muhammad Ali] can sing, but
singing didn't help him to become the heavy-weight champion of the world, swinging
helped him become the heavy-weight champion.

This government has failed us, the government itself has failed us and the white liberals
who have been posing as our friends have failed us. And once we see that all these
sources to which we've turned have failed, we stop turning to them and turn to ourselves.
We need a self-help programme, a do-it-yourself philosophy [thinking], a do-it-right-now
philosophy, an it's-already-too-late philosophy. This is what you and I need …, and the
only way we are going to solve our problem is with a self-help programme. Before we can
get a self-help programme started, we have to have a self-start philosophy.

                      [From https://americaradioworks.publicradio.org. Accessed on 18 November 2016.]

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SOURCE 3C

The photograph below shows two African American women who received food parcels
from the Black Panther Party.

                                                                                         Black
PEOPLE'S                                                                                 Panther
FREE                                                                                     newspaper
FOOD
PROGRAM

                 [From https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com/236x/17/d6/84/17d684cef
                     3691bcba2674fcb6dc68250.jpg. Accessed on 18 November 2016.]

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SOURCE 3D

The source below explains how the US federal agents tried to destabilise the
Black Panther Party.

In attacking the Black Panthers as enemies of the state, federal agents sought to repress
[limit] not just the Party as an organisation, but the political possibility it represented. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Counterintelligence Programme (COINTELPRO)
sought to vilify [belittle] the Black Panthers and 'prevent [the Party and similar] Black
Nationalist groups and leaders from gaining respectability by discrediting them'.

FBI director, J Edgar Hoover, emphasised time and again in different ways that 'one of
our primary aims in counterintelligence, as it concerns the BPP (Black Panther Party), is
to keep this group isolated from the moderate black and white community which may
support it'. Federal agents sought 'to create factionalism [division]' among Party leaders
and between the Panthers and other black political organisations.

FBI operatives forged documents and paid provocateurs [people who were paid to create
instability within the Black Panther Party] to promote violent conflicts between Black
Panther leaders as well as between the Party and other black nationalist organisations,
and congratulated themselves when these conflicts yielded [led to] the killing of members
of the Panthers. And COINTELPRO sought to lead the Party into unsupportable action,
'creating opposition to the BPP on the part of the majority of the residents of the ghetto
areas'. For example, on the government payroll they supplied explosives to Black Panther
members and sought to incite [provoke] them to blow up public buildings and they
promoted kangaroo courts encouraging Panther members to torture suspected
informants.

 [From http://inthesetimes.com/article/15949/how_the_fbi_conspired_to_destroy_the_black_panther_party.
                                                                       Accessed on 22 February 2017.]

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following:

Burnet, A (ed.). 2013. Chambers Book of Great Speeches (Chambers Harrap)

Castro, F. 1981. Fidel Castro Speeches: Cuba's International Foreign Policy 1975–1980
(Pathfinder)

http://cartoonmuseum.eu/en/cartoons/ussr-cuba-angola/

http://cdn.history.com/sites/2/2015/07/hith-cuban-missile-crii.jpg

http://inthesetimes.com/article/15949/how_the_fbi_conspired_to_destroy_the_black_panther
party

http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/17/documents/angola/

https://americaradioworks.publicradio.org

https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com/236x/17/d6/84/17d684cef3691bcba2674fcb6dc
68250.jpg]

Kennedy, RF. 1971. Thirteen Days – A Memoir of the Cuban Missile (WW Norton &
Company)

Ture, K and Hamilton, CV. 1967. Black Power – The Politics of Liberation (Vintage)

Tvedten, I. 1997. Angola. Struggle for Peace and Reconstruction (Westview Press)

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