History P2 (SG) (English) June 2014 Addendum_hlayiso.com_.pdf

Downloaded from hlayiso.com SENIOR CERTIFICATE EXAMINATION HISTORY P2 STANDARD GRADE 2014 ADDENDUM This addendum consists of 10 pages. 3 Copyright reserved Please turn over

Downloaded from hlayiso.com History/SG/P2 2 DBE/2014 SCE – Addendum QUESTION 4: AFRICA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 4.1 WHY WAS THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) FORMED IN 1963? SOURCE 4A This is an extract from the speech delivered by the Emperor of Ethiopia, Haille Selassie, at the founding conference of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Selassie's speech shows optimism behind the founding of the OAU. Today we look to the future calmly, confidently and courageously. We look to the vision of an Africa not merely free but united … We know that there are differences among us. Africans enjoy different cultures, distinctive values and special attributes. But we also know that unity can be and has been attained among men of disparate origins, that differences of race, of religion, of cultures, of tradition are not insuperable (challenging) obstacles to the coming together of peoples. History teaches us that unity is strength, and cautions us to submerge and overcome our differences in the quest for common goals … It is our duty and privilege to rouse the slumbering giant of Africa … to the vision of a single African brotherhood bending its united efforts towards the achievement of a greater and nobler goal. SOURCE 4B This photograph was taken in Ghana after it became the first sub-Saharan country to gain independence from Britain in 1957. The photograph promotes the ideals of African unity. AFRICA MUST UNITE Copyright reserved Please turn over

Downloaded from hlayiso.com History/SG/P2 3 DBE/2014 SCE – Addendum SOURCE 4C This extract focuses on the reasons for the formation of the Organisation of African Unity. The 1963 formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) came about as the newly independent African states realised that they would need to work together if they wanted to raise the economic development of their countries and continent as a whole. Having come out of bitter battles for their liberation from colonialism, African states were keen to ensure that colonialism would not happen again. Additionally, as new members of the international system, they wanted to transform their economies so that they would serve the interests of their indigenous populations and not the colonial powers as they were instructed to do. [Source: Taken from the article 'Institutionalising Pan-Africanism' by T Murithi] SOURCE 4D This is an extract that highlights some of the aims and principles of the OAU during the first phase of its formation in 1963. The article was published on 23 September 2002. The two most important Charter objectives that drove the OAU from its inception to 1975 were to protect the fragile sovereignty recently achieved by African states, and to help those still under colonial or racist rule to achieve sovereign independence. During this period, economic development was not on the OAU agenda. It was mainly concerned with the few interstate conflicts that took place at the time, and with the struggle to eradicate racist and colonial rule in southern Africa. While the first concern involved mediation and some practical action by the OAU, the second concern was mainly conducted through the OAU Liberation Committee, which provided political, diplomatic and some financial support. Another important principle for OAU during this period was the equality of all member states. [Source: Taken from an article 'Africa: From the OAU to the African Union' by Dr Abdalla Bujra] Copyright reserved Please turn over

Downloaded from hlayiso.com History/SG/P2 4 DBE/2014 SCE – Addendum QUESTION 5: CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE SECOND WORLD WAR 5.1 WHAT WERE THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S POLICY OF APPEASEMENT? SOURCE 5A The following extracts focus on the implementation of the policy of appeasement. EXTRACT 1: A speech delivered by Neville Chamberlain, speaking in Kettering in July 1938. … When I think of those four terrible years and I think of the 7 million young men who were cut off in their prime, the 13 million who were maimed and mutilated, the misery and the suffering of the mothers and fathers, the sons and daughters of those who were killed, and the wounded, then I am bound to say … in war … there are no winners but all are losers. It is those thoughts which have made me … strain every nerve to avoid a repetition of the Great War in Europe ... EXTRACT 2: A comment about the Munich Agreement. Give thanks to your God. Your children are safe. Peace is a victory for all mankind. If we must have a victor, let us choose Mr Chamberlain. [Source: The Daily Express, October 1938] SOURCE 5B The extracts below contain information on the implementation of the policy of appeasement. EXTRACT 1: Part of a speech delivered by Winston Churchill in 1938. … Europe is faced with a programme of aggression. There is only one choice open, not only to us but to other countries. Either to submit like Austria, or to take effective measures while time remains to ward off the danger. Where are we going to be in two years' time when the German army will certainly be larger than the French army? ... EXTRACT 2: An article about Chamberlain's policy. … By repeatedly surrendering to force, Chamberlain has encouraged aggression. Chamberlain's policy has always been based on a fatal misunderstanding of the minds of the dictators … [Source: The Yorkshire Post, 3 December 1939] Copyright reserved Please turn over

Downloaded from hlayiso.com History/SG/P2 5 DBE/2014 SCE – Addendum SOURCE 5C The following is an excerpt of a speech delivered by the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain before the House of Commons on 27 September 1938. He justifies reasons for the policy of appeasement. When we were convinced, as we became convinced, that nothing any longer would keep the Sudetenland within the Czechoslovakian state, we urged the Czech government as strong as we could to agree to the cession (ending) of territory, and to agree promptly. The Czech government, through the wisdom and courage of President Benes, accepted the advice of the French government and ourselves. It was a hard decision for anyone who loved his country to take, but to accuse us of having betrayed the Czechoslovakian state is simply preposterous (unbelievable). What we did was to save her from annihilation (total destruction) and give her a chance of a new state, which involves the loss of territory and fortifications (reinforcement), but may perhaps enable her to enjoy in the future and develop a national existence under a neutrality and security comparable to that which we see in Switzerland today. Therefore I think the government deserved the approval of this House for their conduct of affairs in this recent crisis which has saved Czechoslovakia from destruction and Europe from Armageddon. Copyright reserved Please turn over

Downloaded from hlayiso.com History/SG/P2 6 DBE/2014 SCE – Addendum SOURCE 5D This is a cartoon by the British cartoonist David Low. It criticises the policy of appeasement and suggests that Hitler effortlessly crushed small countries such as Austria, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia which put their trust in Britain and France. Copyright reserved Please turn over

Downloaded from hlayiso.com History/SG/P2 7 DBE/2014 SCE – Addendum QUESTION 6: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND EVENTS 1945 TO 1970: THE COLD WAR 6.1 HOW DID THE BERLIN CRISIS INTENSIFY COLD WAR TENSIONS IN THE 1940s? SOURCE 6A This extract explains the Berlin Crisis. Russia's response to this situation was to put pressure on communications between West Berlin and West Germany. In March 1948 new regulations provided for the inspection of traffic along these lines of communication. Then passenger trains were not allowed to leave West Berlin for western zones, and in June the Russians stopped all road and rail traffic between West Berlin and West Germany. There was an immediate crisis. The Western Powers had three alternative courses of action. Firstly, they could evacuate Berlin, but this was rejected because, as the US Commander in Germany said, 'When Berlin falls, Western Germany will be next. If we mean … to hold against Communism, we must not budge.' Secondly, they could use force to reach Berlin, but this was rejected because the risk of a full-scale war between Russia and the West would have been too great. Thirdly, they could maintain contact with West Berlin by air, and this was the alternative that was adopted. For nearly eleven months West Berlin was supplied by air, and vast quantities of supplies were flown in at immense (huge) cost. In May 1949 the Russians ended their ban on land traffic and the crisis ended. The Berlin blockade and the Communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia had three consequences. They accelerated the creation of the state of Western Germany and the formation of a Western defence system, and they made relations between Russia and the West even worse. [Source: World History In The Twentieth Century by RD Cornwell] SOURCE 6B This statement appeared in a Russian newspaper (name unknown), in September 1949. It focuses on the Berlin Crisis. The Soviet authorities were ready to provide food and fuel for the population of the whole of Berlin, but the Western occupying powers deprived the inhabitants of West Berlin of the possibility of obtaining any help from Eastern Germany and tried to represent the situation thus created as a blockade ... The USA organised a so-called 'airlift' to supply West Berlin by air ... This stunt served the purpose of propaganda and was also bound to intensify the Cold War. Copyright reserved Please turn over

Downloaded from hlayiso.com History/SG/P2 8 DBE/2014 SCE – Addendum SOURCE 6C This cartoon depicts the Berlin Blockade of 1948. DEMAND FOR AIR CONTROL RAIL CLOSED ROAD CLOSED BERLIN [Source: Essential Modern World History by S Waugh] Copyright reserved Please turn over

Downloaded from hlayiso.com History/SG/P2 9 DBE/2014 SCE – Addendum SOURCE 6D This extract focuses on the Berlin Crisis. The new currency made necessary the permanent division of Germany. The worthless old marks flooded into the Soviet zone. The Soviet Military Governor had to take emergency measures to protect eastern Germany. To keep out speculators who were making profits out of the currency situation, some barriers were set up on the lines of communication between Berlin and the western zones. [Adapted from an article 'Soviet Foreign Policy' by Ilya S Kremer] Copyright reserved Please turn over

Downloaded from hlayiso.com History/SG/P2 10 DBE/2014 SCE – Addendum ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Extracts and visual sources used in this addendum were taken from the following publications: Bujra, A. 23 September 2002. 'From the OAU to the African Union', based on a lecture delivered at the African Centre for Research and Training in Social Development in Libya. Condon, C. 1994. The Making of the Modern World, Melbourne: Macmillan. Cornwell, RD. World History In The Twentieth Century. Edigheji, O. 2005. A Developmental State in Africa? A concept paper, Centre for Policy Studies: JHB. McAleavy, T. 2003. Twentieth Century: International Relations Since 1919, United Murithi, T. 2009. Institutionalising Pan- Africanism. The Daily Express, October 1938. The Yorkshire Post, 3 December 1939. Walsh, B. 1996. Modern World History, London: John Murray Publishers Ltd. Waugh, S. 2002. Essential Modern World History: Stanley Thornes. Copyright reserved