History Grade 12 P1 Gauteng Mock 2019 Addendum (English)

Downloaded from hlayiso.com GAUTENG DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION PREPARATORY EXAMINATION 2019 10791 HISTORY PAPER 1 ADDENDUM 14 pages P.T.O.

Downloaded from hlayiso.com HISTORY ADDENDUM 2 (Paper 1) 10791/19 GAUTENG DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION PREPARATORY EXAMINATION HISTORY – ADDENDUM (Paper 1) QUESTION 1: WHY DID CUBA BECOME THE FOCAL POINT OF THE COLD WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE SOVIET UNION IN THE 1960s? SOURCE 1A This source explains how President Eisenhower and President Kennedy of the United States of America responded to Cuba becoming a communist country in the 1960s. A left-wing revolution in Cuba ended in 1959, with the ousting of President Fulgencio Batista and the establishment of a new government under Premier Fidel Castro. The Castro regime quickly severed (cut) the country’s formerly strong ties with the United States by expropriating (taking of) U.S. economic assets in Cuba and developing close links with the Soviet Union. These developments proved a source of grave (serious) concern to the United States given Cuba’s geographic proximity (closeness) to the United States and brought Cuba into play as a new and significant factor in the Cold War. In March 1960, President Dwight D. Eisenhower directed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to develop a plan for the invasion of Cuba and the overthrow of the Castro regime. The CIA organised an operation in which it trained and funded a force of exiled counter-revolutionary Cubans serving as the armed wing of the Democratic Revolution Front, known as Brigade 2506. Following his election in November 1960, President John F. Kennedy learned of the invasion plan. He concluded that Fidel Castro was a Soviet client posing a threat to all Latin America. After consultations with his advisors, he gave his consent for the CIA- clandestine (secret) invasion of Cuba to proceed. The failed invasion strengthened the Cuban administration’s position to openly proclaim Cuba’s intention to adopt socialism and pursue closer ties with the Soviet Union. It also led to a review of Cuban policy by the Kennedy administration. The President established a committee under former Army Chief of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor and Attorney-General Robert Kennedy to examine the causes of the defeat suffered at the Bay of Pigs. [From https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/bay-of-pigs Accessed on 20 September 2018.] P.T.O.

Downloaded from hlayiso.com HISTORY ADDENDUM 3 (Paper 1) 10791/19 SOURCE 1B The source below is an extract from a letter that was written on 26 October 1962 by Fidel Castro, President of Cuba, to Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet Premier. It focuses on Castro’s fear of being attacked by the United States of America. Dear Comrade Khrushchev Given the analysis of the situation and the reports which have reached us, I consider an attack to be almost imminent (forthcoming) within the next 24 to 72 hours. There are two possible reasons: The first and most probable one is an air attack against certain objectives with the limited aim of destroying them; the second, and though less probable, yet still possible, is a full invasion. This would require a large force and is the most repugnant (unacceptable) form of aggression which might keep them under control. You can be sure that we will resist with determination, whatever the case. The Cuban people’s morale (confidence) is extremely high and the people will confront aggression heroically (fearlessly). I would like to briefly express my own opinion. If the second reason takes place, and the imperialists invade Cuba with the aim of occupying it, the dangers of their aggression policy are so great that after such an invasion the Soviet Union must never allow circumstances in which the imperialists could carry out a nuclear first strike against it. I tell you this because I believe that the imperialists’ aggression makes them extremely dangerous, and that if they manage to carry out an invasion of Cuba, a brutal act in violation of universal and moral law, then that would be the moment to eliminate (remove) this danger forever, in an act of the most legitimate self-defence. However harsh and terrible the solution, there would be no other. … Fraternally, Fidel Castro [From http://www.cubanet.org/htdocs/ref/dis/10110201.htm Accessed on 25 September 2018.] P.T.O.

Downloaded from hlayiso.com HISTORY ADDENDUM 4 (Paper 1) 10791/19 SOURCE 1C The source below depicts President Kennedy on the left-hand side of the fence and President Khrushchev on the right-hand side of the fence. It is entitled ‘OVER THE GARDEN WALL’ and shows both leaders reading their ‘Hints On Pruning’. TURKEY West Germany Hints On Pruning CUBA Hints On Pruning OVER THE GARDEN WALL [From https://punch.photoshelter.com/gallery-image/Cold-War-Cartoons/ G0000FF70D40KNvU Accessed on 22 August 2018.] President President Kennedy Khrushchev P.T.O.

Downloaded from hlayiso.com HISTORY ADDENDUM 5 (Paper 1) 10791/19 SOURCE 1D The extract below describes the United States of America’s reaction to the deployment of Soviet missiles to Cuba. The President made his decision that afternoon, in favour of a blockade. There was one final meeting the next morning, with General Walter C Sweeney Jr. Commander-in-Chief of the Tactical Air Command, who told the President that even a major surprise air attack could not be certain of destroying all the missile sites and nuclear weapons in Cuba. That ended the small, lingering (remaining) doubt that might still have remained in his mind. It had worried him that the blockade would not remove the missiles, now it was clear that an attack could not accomplish that task completely, either. The strongest argument against the all-out military attack, and no one could answer this to satisfaction, was that a surprise attack would erode if not destroy the moral position of the United States throughout the world. Adlai Stevenson had come from New York to attend the meeting Saturday afternoon, as he had attended several of the EXCOMM meetings. He had always been dubious (uncertain) about the air strike, but at the Saturday meeting he strongly advocated (advised) what he had only tentatively (hesitantly) suggested to me a few days before, namely, that we make it clear to the Soviet Union that if it withdrew its missiles in Cuba, we would be willing to withdraw our missiles from Turkey and Italy and give up our naval base at Guantanamo Bay. [From Thirteen Days, A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, by Robert F. Kennedy Accessed on 23 September 2018.] P.T.O.

Downloaded from hlayiso.com HISTORY ADDENDUM 6 (Paper 1) 10791/19 QUESTION 2: WHAT IMPACT DID THE BATTLE OF CUITO CUANAVALE HAVE ON SOUTH AFRICA? SOURCE 2A The source below focuses on the 20th anniversary of the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. It appeared in the Mail and Guardian and was written by Piero Gleijeses on 11 July 2007. General Magnus Malan writes in his memoirs that this campaign marked a great victory for the South African Defence Force (SADF). But Nelson Mandela could not disagree more: The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, he asserted (declared), ‘was the turning point for the liberation of our continent, and of my people, from the scourge (evil) of apartheid’. Debate over the significance of the Battle Cuito Cuanavale has been intense, partly because the relevant South African documents remain classified. I have, however, been able to study files from the closed Cuban archives as well as many US documents. Despite the ideological divide that separates Havana and Washington, their records tell a remarkably similar story. In July 1987, the Angolan army (FAPLA) launched a major offensive in south- eastern Angola against Jonas Savimbi’s forces. When the offensive started to succeed, the SADF, which controlled the lower reaches of south-western Angola, intervened in the south-east. By early November, the SADF had cornered elite Angolan units in Cuito Cuanavale and was poised (assured) to destroy them. The United Nations Security Council demanded that the SADF unconditionally withdraw from Angola, but the Reagan administration ensured that this demand had no teeth. US Assistant Secretary for Africa, Chester Crocker reassured Pretoria’s ambassador: ‘The resolution did not contain a call for comprehensive sanctions and did not provide for any assistance to Angola.’ [From https://mg.co.za/article/2007-07-11-cuito-cuanavale-revisited Accessed on 21 September 2018.] P.T.O.

Downloaded from hlayiso.com HISTORY ADDENDUM 7 (Paper 1) 10791/19 SOURCE 2B This source focuses on the reasons Cuba got involved in the Angolan civil war. South Africa’s incursion (attack) into Angola spurred (urged) Cuba to act in support of the MPLA. In a news-making 1977 interview with Barbara Walters, Castro stated that when South African troops invaded Angola on 23 October 1975, Cuba had to decide. “Either we would sit idle (still), and South Africa would take over Angola, or we would try to help. That was the moment. On November 5, we made the decision to send the first military unit to Angola to fight against the South African troops.” Castro code-named his ambitious plan Operation Carlota, after an Afro-Cuban slave woman who had staged a revolt in Cuba in 1843. Over the next year, he dispatched (sent) an estimated 36 000 troops to Angola, and that number would grow exponentially (fast). From the beginning, the Cubans were well armed. Although Castro maintained that ‘the Soviet Union never requested that a single Cuban soldier be sent to Angola,’ the Soviet Union did supply Cuba and the MPLA with a large quantity of weaponry, including small arms, tanks, rockets, helicopters, and MiG fighter-planes to defend communism. When Cuba’s armed presence in Angola became known to President Gerald Ford in late 1975, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger immediately announced America’s disapproval, advising Castro that ‘a policy of conciliation (peace-making), between the United States and Cuba would not survive … Cuban armed intervention in the affairs of other nations struggling to decide their own fate’. More than any other issue, Cuba’s involvement in the burgeoning (escalated) Angolan Civil War would play a major part in crippling Cuban-US relations for years to come. [From http://www.historynet.com/cuban-fighters-angolas-civil-war.htm Accessed on 21 September 2018.] P.T.O.

Downloaded from hlayiso.com HISTORY ADDENDUM 8 (Paper 1) 10791/19 SOURCE 2C The source below focuses on the different views on who won the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. One school of thought is that South Africa’s decision to launch the attack was influenced by their intention to rescue UNITA and their desire to seize the town of Cuito Cuanavale through the capture of the air force base. It is argued that the actions of the SADF prior to 23 March 1988 are clear evidence of their determination to break-through to the town. The SADF forces attacked Cuito Cuanavale with the massive 155 mm G-5 guns and staged attack after attack led by the crack 61st Mechanised battalion, 32 Buffalo battalion, and later the 4th SA Infantry group. According to this view, the SADF failed in its intention and was successfully thwarted (stopped) by the combined Angolan forces. The second school of thought maintains that the SADF had only limited objectives, namely, to halt (stop) the enemy at Cuito Cuanavale, to prevent its airstrip from being used, and then to retreat (withdraw). By this time, the South African government had already recognised the political change in Russia and the ending of the Cold War. General Jannie Geldenhuys, Chief of the SADF, stated that the most important battle in the campaign was when the Cubans were defeated at the Lomba River and Cuito Cuanavale was simply part of a mopping up operation after this battle. This view is also supported by General Magnus Malan, the South African Minister of Defence at the time. Following this, the SADF’s intention was to prevent the capture of Mavinga and in that way, prevent assaults on Jamba. This was successfully accomplished. Whether it was a tactical retreat by the SADF or an Angolan forces victory, one cannot contest that the Battle at Cuito Cuanavale was a turning point that brought the border war to an end and led to the peace negotiations that saw the withdrawal of the SADF, MK and Cuban forces from Angola and Namibia and led to the independence of Namibia. [From https://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/battle-cuito-cuanavale-1988 Accessed on 21 September 2018.] P.T.O.

Downloaded from hlayiso.com HISTORY ADDENDUM 9 (Paper 1) 10791/19 SOURCE 2D The photograph below shows FW De Klerk talking to Sam Nujoma the newly elected President of Namibia on 21 March 1990 (Independence Day celebration). [From https://www.gettyimages.ae/detail/news-photo/south-african-president-fw-de-klerk- converses-with-new-news-photo/164615211#/south-african-president-fw-de-klerk-converses-with- new-namibian-sam-picture-id164615211 Accessed on 21 September 2018.] SAM NUJOMA FW DE KLERK P.T.O.

Downloaded from hlayiso.com HISTORY ADDENDUM 10 (Paper 1) 10791/19 QUESTION 3: HOW SUCCESSFUL WAS THE BLACK POWER MOVEMENT IN ATTEMPTING TO END SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE 1960s? SOURCE 3A This source explains the reasons that led to the formation of the Black Power Movement in the United States of America during the 1960s. The Black Power Movement was articulated (voiced) in the cultural, political and economic programmes proposed and developed by vehicles such as the Black Arts Movement, the Student Non-violent Co-ordinating Committee and the Black Panther Party. Together, these organisations encouraged millions of black people. The hundreds of ghetto revolts of the 1960s marked a major turning point in the Black Revolt. During the first wave of unrest in the 1960s, major rebellions unfolded after Dr Martin Luther King’s assassination on 4 April 1968. The second wave was the other two hundred uprisings in 172 cities, in which the youth demanded local autonomy (composition) galvanised (stimulated) by the Black Power slogan. A third wave of youthful activists joined the Black Revolt following the five hundred racial confrontations in 1969. They were the most violent expressions of ethnic conflicts that shaped black consciousness and spread the demand for African-American self-determination. As the uprisings spread from city to city and state to state, a new generation of Black Power organisations developed in their wake with a distinct perspective about the meaning of Black Power, which tested the effectiveness of its approach to black liberation and claimed it to be the true heir (successor) of Malcolm X, who had concluded that Black Americans suffered as an internal colony of the United States and demanded black self-determination. [From http://exhibitions.nypl.org/africanage/essay-black-power.html Accessed on 21 September 2018.] P.T.O.

Downloaded from hlayiso.com HISTORY ADDENDUM 11 (Paper 1) 10791/19 SOURCE 3B The source below focuses on the role and impact of the Black Panther Party. The Black Panther Party for Self-Defence, later known as the Black Panther Party, emerged in the late 1960s at a turning point in the Black Power Movement, as the focus of the struggle turned from the civil rights movement in the South to Black Power in the North. Its goal was to move from non-violent protests to a revolution. The Black Panther Party became the most prominent (noticeable) icon of Black Power, known throughout the United States and the World for their militant commitment and their revolutionary politics. Within a few short years, the party had an active membership numbering in the thousands and a following that was many times larger. The weekly Black Panther Newspaper had a circulation of a quarter-million copies at its high point. By May 1969, the Chicago chapter alone was selling 8 000 copies of the paper each week, soon to increase to 15 000. In 1970, one opinion poll found that 25 percent of African-Americans had great respect for the Black Panther Party, including 43 percent of Blacks under 21 and 5 in every six African-Americans at least agreed with the Panthers that Black people needed to unite to defend themselves. The fall of the Panthers came just as quickly as the organisation endured the full brunt (full force) of state repression, violence and became embroiled (involved) in political debates and conflicts common to many revolutionary organisations of the time. Since then, many books and movies have come out that attempt to define the Panther’s legacy. Some have the explicit (direct) aim of smearing the Panthers as bent on violence and responsible for their own destruction. [From https://socialistworker.org/2016/11/03/revolutionary-legacy-of-the-black-panthers Accessed on 21 September 2018.] P.T.O.

Downloaded from hlayiso.com HISTORY ADDENDUM 12 (Paper 1) 10791/19 SOURCE 3C The cartoon below depicts COINTELPRO, (Counter Intelligence Programme). It launched a series of attacks on the Black Panther Party. [From http://allpower.wordpress.com/teaching/teaching-essays.2017/how-did-the- mainstream-media-potray-the-panthers-respond Accessed 21 September 2018. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION P.T.O.

Downloaded from hlayiso.com HISTORY ADDENDUM 13 (Paper 1) 10791/19 SOURCE 3D The source below explains how the ‘colouring book’ was used by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) to discredit the Black Panther Party. The Black Panther Colouring Book, is but one horrific example of the tactics used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to stifle legitimate dissent (opposition) and violate the civil rights of the political groups that the US government disliked. Along with the anti-war movement, the Nixon White House targeted the Civil Rights Movement and the Black Panther Party for disruption, using on-campus informants to infiltrate (invade) and in many cases to disrupt legal protests and activism. This colouring book, which was purported (claimed) to be from the Black Panther Party, had been rejected by FBI Headquarters when it was brought to them by a man later revealed to have intelligence connections. Not troubled by the fact that the Black Panther Party found the ‘colouring book’ revolting, the FBI added even more offensive illustrations and mass mailed it across America. It so infuriated (angered) the white population that they stopped listening to the legitimate grievances of the black people. While it can be maintained that such an action did not technically violate the rights of the Black Panther Party to free speech and even as it sabotaged the willingness of the people to listen, it is apparent that such a divisive act violated the right of the people, black and white, to peacefully assemble. [From https://www.socialistworker.org/2016/11/03/revolutionary-legacy-of-the-black-panthers Accessed on 21 September 2018.] P.T.O.

Downloaded from hlayiso.com HISTORY ADDENDUM 14 (Paper 1) 10791/19 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following: Kennedy, R.F. 1968. Thirteen Days, A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (McCall Corporation, New York) http://allpower.wordpress.com/teaching/teaching-essays.2017/how-did-the-mainstream- media-potray-the-panthers-respond http://exhibitions.nypl.org/africanage/essay-black-power.html http://www.cubanet.org/htdocs/ref/dis/10110201.htm https://www.gettyimages.ae/detail/news-photo/south-african-president-fw-de-klerk- converses-with-new-news-photo/164615211#/south-african-president-fw-de-klerk- converses-with-new-namibian-sam-picture-id164615211 http://www.historynet.com/cuban-fighters-angolas-civil-war.htm https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/bay-of-pigs https://mg.co.za/article/2007-07-11-cuito-cuanavale-revisited https://punch.photoshelter.com/gallery-image/Cold-War-Cartoons/G0000FF70D40KNvU https://socialistworker.org/2016/11/03/revolutionary-legacy-of-the-black-panthers https://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/battle-cuito-cuanavale-1988 https://www.socialistworker.org/2016/11/03/revolutionary-legacy-of-the-black-panthers END