History Grade 12 P1 NSC November 2012 Addendum (English)

Downloaded from hlayiso.com GRAAD 12 NATIONAL SENIOR CERTIFICATE GRADE 12 HISTORY P1 NOVEMBER 2012 ADDENDUM This addendum consists of 15 pages. Copyright reserved Please turn over

Downloaded from hlayiso.com History/P1 2 DBE/November 2012 NSC – Addendum QUESTION 1: HOW DID THE USA AND THE USSR CONTRIBUTE TO THE COLD WAR TENSIONS IN CUBA? SOURCE 1A The source below consists of two extracts which focus on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Extract 1: This is Andrei Gromyko's view, the Soviet Union's foreign secretary, of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The United States over several years had established offensive military bases around the socialist countries and, primarily, near the USSR borders ... the placement of medium-range effective Soviet missiles in Cuba was undertaken only after the United States' ruling circles continually rejected proposals to remove American military bases, including missile sites, on foreign territory. [From: Through Russian Eyes: President Kennedy's 1 036 Days by A Gromyko] Extract 2: In 1984 Fidel Castro was interviewed by an American journalist, Tad Szulc. The journalist asked Castro why he was willing to allow Soviet missiles to be placed in Cuba. It was necessary to make it clear to the United States that an invasion of Cuba would imply a war with the Soviet Union. It was then that they proposed the missiles ... We preferred the risks, whatever they were, of a great tension, a great crisis, to the risks of the impotence (inability) of having to await a United States invasion of Cuba. [From: The Cuban Missile Crisis – To the Brink of War by PJ Byrne] SOURCE 1B This was the main headline of The New York Times, 23 October 1962. It highlights the USA's blockade of Soviet missiles to Cuba. Copyright reserved Please turn over

Downloaded from hlayiso.com History/P1 3 DBE/November 2012 NSC – Addendum SOURCE 1C The source below consists of letters written by President Khrushchev and President Kennedy on their involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Viewpoint 1: This is part of a letter that was written by President Khrushchev to President Kennedy on 24 October 1962. You, Mr President, are not declaring a quarantine (blockade), but rather are setting forth an ultimatum and threatening that if we do not give in to your demands you will use force ... No, Mr President, I cannot agree to this, and I think that in your own heart you recognise that I am correct. I am convinced that in my place you would act the same way. Therefore the Soviet Government cannot instruct the captains of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba to observe the orders of American naval forces blockading that island. Naturally we will not simply be bystanders with regard to piratical (robbing) acts by American ships on the high seas. We will then be forced on our part to take the measures we consider necessary and adequate in order to protect our rights. We have everything necessary to do so. Viewpoint 2: This is part of a letter in which President Kennedy responds to President Khrushchev, written on 25 October 1962. In this letter President Kennedy states that the crisis was due to Soviet interference in Cuba. In early September I indicated very plainly that the United States would regard any shipment of offensive weapons as presenting the gravest issues. After that time, this Government received the most explicit (clear) assurances (guarantees) from your Government and its representatives ... that no offensive weapons were being sent to Cuba. I ask you to recognise clearly, Mr Chairman, that it was not I who issued the first challenge in this case, and that in the light of this record these activities in Cuba required the responses I have announced. [From: Thirteen Days/Ninety Miles – The Cuban Missile Crisis by NH Finkelstein] Copyright reserved Please turn over

Downloaded from hlayiso.com History/P1 4 DBE/November 2012 NSC – Addendum QUESTION 2: WHAT WERE THE POSSIBILITIES AND CONSTRAINTS OF JULIUS NYERERE'S POLICY OF AFRICAN SOCIALISM ON TANZANIA IN THE 1960s? SOURCE 2A The source below comprises a written and a visual source on Julius Nyerere's policy of ujamaa. Written Source: J Brennan focuses on the reasons for Julius Nyerere's preference for rural development. This was Nyerere's attempt to create an economically self-sufficient Tanzania. Shortly after independence, Julius Nyerere had proclaimed that ujamaa or African Socialism was Tanzania's aim, and that there was 'no room for land parasites' (urban dwellers that benefited from the labour of the peasants). In 1962, the same year that Nyerere published his pamphlet Ujamaa – The Basis of African Socialism, the government effectively nationalised all lands through the Freehold Titles Act. Opportunities for public political dissent (disagreement) quickly constricted (disappeared) after independence and were practically eliminated following the abortive (failed) 1964 army mutiny (rebellion), after which Tanzania's labour unions were nationalised and a one-party state was constitutionally inscribed (formed) the next year … Ujamaa roughly translated as 'familyhood'. 'The foundation, and the objective, of African socialism,' Julius Nyerere wrote, 'is the extended family.' In his formulation, ujamaa calls for the return to African traditional society, presently damaged or destroyed by European colonialism but where previously there had been 'hardly any room for parasitism'. True socialism was an 'attitude of the mind' where people fought the acquisitive (greedy) impulse that led individuals or groups within the 'tribe' to exploit one another … The principal duty of the ujamaa revolution was to remove exploitation and bring justice in its place … [From: Journal of African History, No. 47 by J Brennan] Copyright reserved Please turn over

Downloaded from hlayiso.com History/P1 5 DBE/November 2012 NSC – Addendum Visual Source: This photograph, taken by a student, depicts Tanzanians working on a communal farm in Segera village, 1971. [From: Tanzania: The Struggle for Ujamaa, Cape Town International Labour Research and Information Group by Ilrig] Copyright reserved Please turn over

Downloaded from hlayiso.com History/P1 6 DBE/November 2012 NSC – Addendum SOURCE 2B The following source consists of two viewpoints regarding Nyerere's vision for Tanzania. Viewpoint 1: K Shillington argues that Nyerere's drive for self-reliance was a failure. Tanzania's ujamaa had a built-in contradiction (challenge). It was self-help imposed from above. In practice peasant cultivators were reluctant (unwilling) to move from areas where their ancestors were buried and where their families had successfully grown crops for generations. They were also reluctant (unwilling) to give up the personal security of private plots for the sake of communal ones. When persuasion would not work, government turned to compulsory 'villagisation' … On a national scale, Tanzania in the 1980s remained one of the poorest countries in Africa. It had huge foreign debts and was still dependent upon exporting agricultural raw materials – coffee, cotton, sisal – at prices controlled outside Africa, in exchange for increasingly expensive manufactured imports. [From: History of Africa by K Shillington] Viewpoint 2: P Nugent states that Nyerere's dream of self-reliance was a success. A greater achievement lay in delivering basic education and health services to the hitherto (previously) neglected rural majority. The government remained true to its promise of counteracting the trend towards urban bias by building very few new hospitals, on the principle that they were expensive and served the urban minority, whilst expanding primary health care at the village level. In 1977, Nyerere could report that whereas there had only been 42 rural health centres in 1967, there were 152 of these in 1976 and still more were on the way. The number of rural medical workers had also more than doubled, and by 1978 some 8 000 villages had been provided with their own dispensaries. An important contribution towards checking water-borne disease lay in furnishing potable (drinkable) water. By 1978 some 7,7 million rural dwellers were the beneficiaries (receivers) of piped water supplies. Partly as a result of these various interventions, average life expectancy is estimated to have risen from 40 years in 1967 to 52 years in 1979. [From: Africa Since Independence by P Nugent] Copyright reserved Please turn over

Downloaded from hlayiso.com History/P1 7 DBE/November 2012 NSC – Addendum QUESTION 3: WHAT FORMS OF CIVIL SOCIETY PROTEST EMERGED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA) IN THE 1960s? SOURCE 3A The source below comprises a written and a visual source on the activities of the Civil Rights Movement. Written Source: This account by Ruby Doris Smith, a seventeen-year-old African American student, describes her experience at the Spelman College in Atlanta, 1960. When the student committee was formed, I told my older sister to put me on the list. And when two hundred students were selected for the first demonstration, I was among them. I went through the food line in the restaurant at the State Capitol with six other students, but when we got to the cashier, she wouldn't take our money. The lieutenant-governor came down and told us to leave. We didn't and went to the county jail. Visual Source: A photograph showing black and white activists being harassed by white Americans while embarking on a sit-in at a segregated restaurant in Jackson, Mississippi, June 1963. From: Moments in Time by The Associated Press, New York] Copyright reserved Please turn over

Downloaded from hlayiso.com History/P1 8 DBE/November 2012 NSC – Addendum SOURCE 3B The source below consists of a written and a visual source. It focuses on civil rights activists who undertook a non-racial journey of reconciliation called the Freedom Rides in 1961 across the various states in the USA. Written Source: The following extract focuses on the experiences by both Freedom Riders and authorities during the Freedom Rides of 1961. The strategy was that an interracial group would board buses destined for the South. The whites would sit in the back and the blacks in the front. At rest stops, the whites would go into blacks-only areas and vice versa. 'This was not civil disobedience, really,' explained CORE (Congress of Racial Equality) director James Farmer, 'because we [were] merely doing what the Supreme Court said we had a right to do.' But the Freedom Riders expected to meet resistance. 'We felt we could count on the racists of the South to create a crisis so that the federal government would be compelled to enforce the law,' said Farmer. 'When we began the ride I think all of us were prepared for as much violence as could be thrown at us. We were prepared for the possibility of death.' The Freedom Ride left Washington DC on 4 May 1961. It was scheduled to arrive in New Orleans on 17 May. On Mother's Day, 14 May, the Freedom Riders split up into two groups to travel through Alabama. The first group was met by a mob of about 200 angry people in Anniston. The mob stoned the bus and slashed the tires (tyres). The bus managed to get away, but when it stopped about six miles out of town to change the tires (tyres), it was firebombed. The other group did not fare any better. It was greeted by a mob in Birmingham, and the Riders were severely beaten. Birmingham's Public Safety Commissioner, Bull Conner, claimed he posted no officers at the bus depot because of the holiday; however, it was later discovered that the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) knew of the planned attack and that the city police stayed away on purpose. [Cited from http:www.watson.org/~lisa/blackhistory/civilrights-55-65/freeride.html. Accessed 10 February 2012] Copyright reserved Please turn over

Downloaded from hlayiso.com History/P1 9 DBE/November 2012 NSC – Addendum Visual Source: This photograph taken on 14 May 1961 shows a burning bus. The bus, used by the Freedom Riders, was attacked by conservative Americans. The Freedom Riders can be seen sitting next to the burning bus near Anniston, Alabama. [From: GCSE Modern World History: The USA, 1945–75: Land of Freedom by B Walsh] Copyright reserved Please turn over

Downloaded from hlayiso.com History/P1 10 DBE/November 2012 NSC – Addendum SOURCE 3C This photograph taken on 17 March 1960 shows M Walker, P Alexander, D Nash and S Hemphill eating lunch at a previously segregated counter at the Post House Restaurant in the Greyhound Bus Terminal. This was the first time since the start of the sit-ins that African-Americans were served at previously all-white counters in Nashville. [From Internet site: http://www.crmvet.org/images/imgcoll.htm. Accessed 10 February 2012] Copyright reserved Please turn over

Downloaded from hlayiso.com History/P1 11 DBE/November 2012 NSC – Addendum QUESTION 4: HOW DID THE PHILOSOPHY OF BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS INFLUENCE THE SOWETO UPRISING OF 1976? SOURCE 4A This extract focuses on the influence that the philosophy of Black Consciousness had on the Soweto Uprising of 1976. It was written in 1978 by John Kane-Berman, who was a member of the SRC at the University of the Witwatersrand. One of the principal factors explaining the new mood of assertiveness (self-confidence) so evident among black youth in many parts of the country is the growth of the Black Consciousness philosophy. This is one of the most important developments in South Africa in recent years… At about the same time, black students, after much soul- searching, broke away from the multi-racial but white-dominated National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) to form the South African Students' Organisation (SASO). After that, numerous organisations espousing (standing for) Black Consciousness were formed, including the South African Students' Movement (SASM) among schoolchildren and the Black People's Convention (BPC), a political organisation, of which Steve Biko was honorary president at the time of his death ... The extent of allegiance (loyalty) to SASM and the degree to which schoolchildren in general identify with Black Consciousness are not readily measurable. Again, it appears as if the impact on both African and Coloured schoolgoers, and particularly on their leaders, has been very considerable. A small but telling example of how blacks' self-images have been changing and of their growing readiness to act was provided by pupils at a Coloured high school in the Cape. In November 1976 more than 100 of the 180 pupils boycotted an examination on a book called Swart Pelgrim by FA Venter. In the past they had not objected to this book, but now they said it was biased because it showed blacks in an inferior light, and that it was frustrating and humiliating. The only good thing about it was that it showed how whites had been exploiting blacks. The students tore up and burnt copies of the book. [From: SOWETO Black Revolt, White Reaction by J Kane-Berman] Copyright reserved Please turn over

Downloaded from hlayiso.com History/P1 12 DBE/November 2012 NSC – Addendum SOURCE 4B This cartoon by Abe Berry which appeared in The Star newspaper, depicts the reasons for the Soweto Uprising of June 1976. (Date unknown) [From: Act by Act 40 Years of Nationalist Rule in South Africa. A Cartoon History of Apartheid by A Berry] Copyright reserved Please turn over

Downloaded from hlayiso.com History/P1 13 DBE/November 2012 NSC – Addendum SOURCE 4C This source consists of a testimony by Colonel Kleingeld and an account by Jon-Jon Mkhonza regarding the shooting of students during the Soweto Uprising of 1976. Colonel Kleingeld's Testimony: A policeman stationed at the Orlando Police Station submitted the following testimony to the Cillié Commission. This commission was set up after the 1976 Soweto Uprising and the report was presented to parliament in 1979. As we came directly opposite the street where they were moving, they immediately started throwing stones and moving towards us. At this stage it was clear to me that they were aggressive … I deduced that the purpose of the march was to destroy property and to endanger lives ... They were now so close that I was hit on the left thigh. The windscreen of my vehicle was shattered … I threw three [gas] canisters into the crowd in an attempt to stop their attack and disperse them. The tear gas had no significant effect on the crowd and further stoning was let loose on us ... It was now decided to launch a dog and baton attack to disperse the crowd. The purpose was to push the crowd back until help arrived … I saw that one of the dogs had been beaten to death. I also saw that we were completely surrounded. Stone throwing came from all directions. The only solution to protect our lives and property was to shoot warning shots in the air … I did not give an instruction to fire. However, some police were shooting out of desperation. I myself never saw that a person was dead or injured. I later heard that the leader or agitator was indeed dead and removed by a vehicle. [From: The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 2 [1970–1980] edited by B Theron] Jon-Jon Mkhonza's Account: This focuses on how a number of police vehicles were sent to intimidate students while they were singing 'Morena boloka sechaba Sa Heso' ('God Bless Our Nation'). He led this march during the Soweto Uprising. 'The police told us to disperse. But we refused, saying that, "No, we are not going to intimidate anybody, we are not going to loot, we are not going to do anything wrong. We are just going to march, and demonstrate and sing and then go back home." They again said that we must disperse. 'Police dogs were then released. These vicious, well-trained dogs were grabbed and destroyed,' an eyewitness recalls. 'That was when the police took up position and started shooting teargas. All hell broke loose … 'Students were scattered, running up and down … coming back, running … It was some kind of a game because they were running away; coming back, taking stones, throwing them at the police … It was chaos. Whenever the police shot teargas, we jumped the wall and then came back and started again. It was during this battle that journalists reported seeing a policeman draw his revolver and, without warning, fire directly into the crowd. Seconds later, several other policemen opened fire. That's when Hector Pieterson was shot,' says Mkhonza. [From: Soweto a History by P Bonner and L Segal] Copyright reserved Please turn over

Downloaded from hlayiso.com History/P1 14 DBE/November 2012 NSC – Addendum SOURCE 4D The following is an extract by Black Consciousness leader, Steve Biko. It focuses on the impact that the philosophy of Black Consciousness had on the youth. Now when these youngsters started with their protests they were talking about Afrikaans, they were talking about Bantu education, and they meant that. But the government responded in a high-handed fashion, assuming as they always have done that they were in a situation of total power. But here for once they met a student group which was not prepared to be thrown around all the time. They decided to flex their muscles, and of course, the whole country responded. There are lessons to be gleaned (accumulated) from this whole unrest situation of last year. In the first instance, I think blacks have flexed their muscles a bit – and they now know the degree of dedication they can find among their own members when they are called to action. And they now know the kind of responses they will get from the various segments of the population – the youth, the older ones and so on. The second lesson is of course the response from the government and the white population at large. The government responded in one way, and the white population also in another way. One doesn't want to get into details here but reading these newspapers you get some kind of idea of the extent of fear that was prevalent in white society at a particular time, especially just after the first onslaught in Soweto where there was a real fear throughout the community throughout the country. Nobody knew just where something would happen next. [From: I write what I like by S Biko] Copyright reserved Please turn over

Downloaded from hlayiso.com History/P1 15 DBE/November 2012 NSC – Addendum ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following sources: Berry, A. 1989. Act by Act 40 Years of Nationalist Rule in South Africa (Jonathan Ball) Biko, S. 1978. I Write What I Like (Heinemann) Bonner, P et al. 1998. Soweto: A History (Maskew Miller Longman) Brennan, J. 2006. Journal of African History, No 47 (Cambridge University, United Kingdom) Byrne, P. 2006. The Cuban Missile Crisis – To the Brink of War (White-Thomson Publishing) Finkelstein, NH. 2000. Thirteen Days/Ninety Miles (Universe.com, Inc.) Gromyko, A. 1973. Through Russian Eyes: President Kennedy's 1 036 Days (Washington International Library) http://www.crmvet.org/images/imgcoll.htm http://www.watson.org/~lisa/blackhistory/civilrights-55-65/freeride.html ILRIG. 1988. Tanzania: The Struggle for Ujamaa (Creda Press, Cape Town) Kane-Berman, J. 1978. SOWETO Black Revolt White Reaction (Ravan Press) Moments in Time (The Associated Press, New York) Nugent, P. 2004. Africa Since Independence (Palgrave) Shillington, K. 1989. History of Africa (Macmillan Publishers, London) The New York Times, 23 October 1962 Theron B. 2007. The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 2 [1970–1980]. (Unisa Press, University of South Africa, Pretoria) Walsh, B. 2001. GCSE Modern World History: The USA, 1945–75: Land of Freedom (John Murray Publishers, London) Copyright reserved